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Most judges display an exemplary demeanor in their courtrooms, behaving
with courtesy and civility on the bench.1 However, some judges exhibit anger
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1. Most state bar associations conduct judicial preference polls that reflect overall
satisfaction with judicial demeanor. For example, a recent survey by the Houston Bar Association
asked whether certain trial judges are “courteous and attentive toward attorneys and witnesses[.]”
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and hostility toward those who appear before them in their courtrooms.2 The
public has become increasingly dissatisfied by judges’ behavior that does not
match their obligation to behave with courtesy and civility on the bench.3 As
commentators begin to wrestle with the issue of angry judges,4 the public and
the legal community are calling for greater transparency within the system of
judicial discipline, hoping to stem the tide of judicial misbehavior.5 Displays of
judicial anger toward those in courtrooms appear to be on the rise, though this
perception could certainly be skewed due to the ubiquity of the press and social
media.6
HOUSTON BAR ASS’N, HOUSTON BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL EVALUATION RESULTS (2013),
available at http://www.hba.org/folder-poll-results/2011HBA_evaluation.pdf. Overall, the results
reflect satisfaction with the demeanor of trial judges. See id.
2. Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2012). See generally
Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against Judge on Ground of Abusive or Intemperate Language or
Conduct Toward Attorneys, Court Personnel, or Parties to or Witnesses in Actions, and the Like,
89 A.L.R. 4th 278 (1991) (providing a comprehensive list of cases, in which judges exhibited angry
and abusive behavior).
3. See KEVIN BURKE & STEVE LEBEN, AMERICAN JUDGES ASS’N, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS:
A KEY INGREDIENT IN PUBLIC SATISFACTION 6–8 (2007) (noting that citizens expect to be treated
respectfully when appearing before a judge). Some perceive judges as celebrities because of how
much attention the public devotes to them. See Pierce J. Reed, Lady Justice: U.S. Magistrate Judge
Joyce London Alexander, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 901, 902 (2003-2004) (noting that “[f]or better or
worse, [judges] are starring players in the pageantry of modern media. They serve as saviors and
sinners; they may be heroic or hated, revered or reviled.”). The American Bar Association (ABA)’s
Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to be “patient, dignified, and courteous” to those
who appear before them. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2007). Most states
include some version of this rule in their rules of judicial conduct.
4. See e.g., Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 11, 12 (2001);
Maroney, supra note 2, at 1208. See also Douglas R. Richmond, Bullies on the Bench, 72 LA. L.
REV. 325, 330 (2012).
5. See William Glaberson, A Push to Open Judge-Misconduct Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2011, at A19. See also Eric Dexheimer, Who’s Policing Texas Judges?, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Apr. 15, 2012, at A1 (noting that the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct’s judicial disciplinary
records are confidential); Brian Rogers, Defense Lawyers Complain Judges Rarely Punished,
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2012, at B1 (noting “[t]hat lack of transparency, about complaints and
results, is what frustrates those who want to see judges punished. It also runs counter to the public
nature of courtrooms, where most information is supposed to be public”).
6. Almost monthly, the press contains examples of judges displaying anger in their
courtrooms. To illustrate, in August 2012, the Daily Mail reported on a hearing, discussed later in
this Article, in which a judge screamed at a pastor. Laura Pullman, “Watch moment judge screams
at pastor during divorce hearing because he blames him for negative publicity (oh, the irony),”
MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 11, 2012, 9:44 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2186994/
Judge-William-Wakins-Judge-screams-pastor-divorce-hearing-blames-bad-publicity.html. This
was also reported by the Huffington Post, see David Lohr, Arthur Hage Yelled At By Judge William
Watkins, Says ‘It’s Not Over’, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2012, 2:53 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/arthur-hage-william-watkins_n_1764984.html, and
the West Virginia Gazette, see Kate White, Online video latest in Putnam judge-pastor feud, W.
VA. GAZETTE (June 27, 2012), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201206270260. In October 2012,
the Houston Chronicle reported on a similar incident in which a judge yelled at a pregnant woman.
Harvey Rice, Galveston judge accused of screaming at pregnant woman in court, HOUS. CHRON.
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This Article addresses the intersection between judicial anger and attempts by
judicial sanctioning tribunals to correct the behavior with public sanctions.
Disciplinary tribunals tend to impose public sanctions as harsh discipline for a
judge’s egregiously hostile behavior or repeated displays of anger.7 This Article
challenges the notion that public discipline motivates a judge’s positive
behavioral changes. For some judges, particularly those whose wrongdoing
involves anger, this approach is counterproductive, as shame from the publicity
of wrongdoing can stigmatize the judge, exacerbating her anger, hostility, and
sense of isolation.8 Organizations involved in regulating judicial behavior9 and
legislatures involved in making laws regarding the authority of these
organizations should work toward a more deliberate philosophy of judicial
corrections.
Adopting such a philosophy will ensure that the consequences flowing from
judicial discipline are the intended ones.10 Commentators provide a rich arsenal
of valuable research and insights to guide legislators and judges, particularly
with regard to shaming penalties.11 However, legal academia has yet to address
the vices and virtues of shaming in the specific context of judicial discipline;
literature concerning the effectiveness of public discipline by judicial

(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.chron.com/communityblogs/atmosphere/article/tba-3981139.php. On
November 8, 2012, the ABA Journal reported on an Illinois judge who won reelection despite
previously being barred from the courthouse for shoving a sheriff’s deputy. See Debra Cassens
Weiss, Judge Barred from Courthouse Wins Re-Election, Presses Insanity Defense in Battery Case,
AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Nov. 8, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_
barred_from_courthouse_wins_re-election_presses_insanity_defense_in_b/.
7. If the behavior is particularly egregious and the public sanction (sometimes imposed more
than once) did not suffice, the tribunals typically impose a suspension in conjunction with a public
reprimand of the judge as a more effective method of discipline. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 882–83 (Wash. 2010) (demonstrating that the Supreme
Court of Washington suspended a judge for five days without pay after noting that the judge had
already been censured once by the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct).
8. See infra note 11.
9. Judicial conduct commissions, state bar associations, and educational organizations such
as the National Judicial College should work together towards improving judicial education and
discipline to better protect the public from outbursts by angry judges.
10. In the criminal law arena, commentators have similarly reflected on consequences flowing
from criminal punishment. See Amanda D. Cary, Comment: Cocaine Base: Not All It’s Cracked
Up to Be, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 554 (2006) (discussing the utilitarianism and retributivism
theories of punishment). See also Brian Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from
Victimization to Reintegration, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1209, 1262 (2010-2011) (analyzing the impact of
sentencing policy in past decades); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (noting that
“during the past several decades, the justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past crimes
to preventing future violations through the incarceration and control of dangerous offenders”).
11. See infra Part II.B. Although disciplinary tribunals do not refer to public sanctions
imposed on judges as shaming penalties, publicizing a judge’s name and wrongdoing is meant to
express the tribunal’s disapproval of the judge’s conduct and thus it should come as no surprise that
stigma is likely to flow from the discipline.
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sanctioning tribunals at modifying this type of judicial behavior is sparse.12 This
Article is the first to tackle whether disciplining an angry judge with public
sanctions—sanctions likely to shame the judge—are effective at modifying the
judge’s behavior and thereby protecting the public.
The Article broaches this topic in the context of the “social media effect,”13 a
recent phenomenon that should inform judicial discipline. This phenomenon is
changing the landscape of judicial discipline by altering the consequences a
judge suffers as a result of her misbehavior. The Article demonstrates that the
consequences a judge experiences because her wrongdoing is broadcast via
social media can be minimal or substantial, ranging from mildly disparaging
tweets to death threats.14 This effect is impacting the course of traditional
judicial discipline because the public strives to participate, at times pressuring
sanctioning bodies to take action against an angry judge.15
Part I of the Article illustrates the reality facing some litigants and lawyers in
courtrooms: angry judges. Relying on social science research involving
shaming as discipline and the effect of social media, Part II of the Article
suggests that shaming an already angry judge in a public manner that stigmatizes
the judge is likely to lead the judge to resist the sanctioning tribunal and become
increasingly hostile. Part III of the Article describes the social media effect,
explaining that displays of judicial anger are often publicized, regardless of
formal disciplinary proceedings.16
12. In a recent article, Jonathan Abel provides empirical evidence to evaluate three commonly
held beliefs about the aggressiveness with which different judicial conduct commissions impose
discipline on judges. See Jonathan Abel, Note, Testing Three Commonsense Intuitions About
Judicial Conduct Commissions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1048–49 (2012). The data Abel collected
shows substantial disparities among jurisdictions in terms of their aggressiveness in sanctioning
judges. Id. at 1055–56. Although Abel’s article provides much needed insight and empirical
evidence regarding the inconsistencies among sanctioning commissions, nowhere in the existing
literature do academics tackle the basic question of whether the type of discipline currently imposed
on judges is effective at protecting the public.
13. See Zahera Harb, Arab Revolutions and the Social Media Effect, M/C J.,
http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index/php/mcjournal/article/view/364 (last visited Mar. 26,
2014) (coining the term “social media effect” and describing the phenomenon’s effect on Middle
Eastern politics). In this Article, the term refers to the impact social media has on judges by
publicizing their misbehavior, giving the public an opportunity to respond, and, at times, impacting
the disciplinary process.
14. See infra Part III (describing several instances of strong public reaction to wrongdoing by
judges).
15. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (describing a situation in which the public
pressured a judicial conduct commission to take action regarding a judge’s purported misbehavior;
the public’s response was so overwhelming that the commission had to require that no further
complaints be filed).
16. Social media provides the public easy access to information concerning angry judges, and
the public is often eager to “weigh in” by commenting on judicial misbehavior. Stories of judges
displaying “unjudgelike” behavior routinely appear in newspapers, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text, and bar journals, see, e.g., Martha Neil, See the Video: Angry Judge Blasts
‘Backseat Driver’ Appellate Counsel in High-Profile Murder Case, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Oct. 9.,
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Part IV of the Article recommends innovative forms of discipline, including
methods of keeping the process of judicial discipline outside the traditional
disciplinary system. This section recommends education and mentoring on the
subject of preventing or constraining anger as well as early intervention in the
form of peer-to-peer counseling and reconciliation meetings to use reintegrative
shame, rather than stigmatizing shame, to motivate angry judges’ improved
behavior.
Procedural fairness17 and restorative justice18 shape this discussion. In the
criminal law context, these approaches suggest that as sanctions become more
punitive and stigmatizing, they become less effective because individuals
become less inclined to follow authority.19 On the other hand, individuals
become self-regulating when they respect authority and rules as legitimate.20
This Article suggests that, along the same lines, judicial sanctioning bodies
should impose discipline that encourages judges to self-regulate, rather than
using corrective methods that stigmatize.
2012, 1:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jefferson_circuit_kentucy_judge_
martin_mcdonald_backseat_driver_video/; Weiss, supra note 6. YouTube, Troy from West
Virginia, Putnam County, WV, Family Law Judge, William Watkins, May 23, 2012
MELTDOWN!!!!!, YOUTUBE (June 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APD4a347bPQ
[hereinafter Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video], and websites devoted to publicizing information
about judges, see ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com (last visited May 9, 2014); CITIZENS
FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.judicialaccountaibility.net (last visited May 9, 2014);
CITIZENS FOR LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.clr.org (last visited May 9, 2014); ROBEPROBE,
http://www.robeprobel.com (last visited May 9, 2014); VERY BAD JUDGES, http://verybad
judges.blogspot.com (last visited May 9, 2014), provide ample coverage of judges displaying
hostility in their courtrooms, and also allow the public to react to the judicial behavior.
17. Procedural fairness suggests that “process matters” because “people’s evaluations of the
resolution of a dispute (including matters resolved by the judicial system) are influenced more by
their perception of the fairness of the process employed than by their belief regarding whether the
‘right’ outcome was reached.” Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath,
Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice
to Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 200 (2012).
See also Jordan M. Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1443, 1456–58
(2011) (highlighting the importance of fair judicial procedures).
18. Restorative justice is an approach to resolving disputes that emphasizes “1) deliberation
and decision making by a diverse group of stakeholders [in the dispute] and 2) discussion that
focuses on repairing the damage caused by the offender.” Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T.
Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 255 (2012).
It typically takes the form of victim/offender mediations, conferencing among stakeholders, and
sentencing circles. Id. Restorative justice is also described as “a process that brings victims and
offenders together to face each other, to inform each other about their crimes and victimization, to
learn about each others’ backgrounds, and to collectively reach agreement on a ‘penalty’ or
‘restorative justice sanction.’” Meghan Condon, Note, Bruise of a Different Color: The
Possibilities of Restorative Justice for Minority Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 487, 495 (2010).
19. See Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule
Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307, 308 (2006) (explaining that hostility can result from punitive
policies).
20. Id. at 308–09.
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I. ANGRY JUDGES
What is it about judges and anger? Countless examples exist of judges losing
their tempers and lashing out at parties, lawyers, and personnel in their
courtrooms.21 Sometimes, litigants or lawyers appear to provoke judicial
anger;22 in other instances, a difficult or emotional case gives rise to a judicial
outburst.23 Occasionally, judges seem to fly off the handle with no apparent
provocation.24
YouTube provides several examples of judges expressing anger in court.
West Virginia’s Putnam Circuit Judge William Watkins was videotaped
screaming at pastor Arthur Hage in court during Hage’s divorce proceedings in
2012.25 In the video, which was posted on YouTube on June 26, 2012 and has
since received over 250,000 hits, the judge chastises Hage for speaking to a
reporter who wrote an article posted on PutnamLive.com, which apparently
showed a picture of the judge’s home.26 The judge claimed his property was
vandalized several times as a result of the photo.27 Judge Watkins started the
hearing as follows: “Mr. Hage, if you say one word out of turn, you’re going to
jail. Do you understand me? . . . Shut up! Don’t even speak . . . . You disgusting
piece of [inaudible].”28 He screamed at Hage during most of their exchange.
Judge Watkins later recused himself from any other proceedings in Hage’s case,
admitting he lost his temper.29
Hage filed several complaints against Watkins with the Judicial Investigation
Commission of West Virginia.30 Soon after the hearing, the West Virginia
21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. Richmond, supra note 4, at 328–29 (“Even judges who enjoy impressive self-control and
gracious bearings may sometimes lose patience with incompetent or uncivil lawyers, or especially
difficult or disruptive litigants.”).
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 26–28 (describing a
judge’s outburst against a party the judge thought had engaged in inappropriate out of court conduct
against the judge and the judge’s family).
24. See, e.g., John Council, Jones Says Dennis Accepted Her Apology After Heated “Shut
Up” Exchange, TEX. LAWYER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202516573154
(describing an en banc oral argument in which Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Edith Jones
interrupted her colleague’s questioning and told him to “shut up”).
25. See Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16. After Watkins granted the divorce
petition filed by Hage’s wife, Hage sued the judge for $5 million. White, supra note 6. He has
also appealed the divorce to West Virginia’s Supreme Court. Id. Judge Watkins brings his dog,
Buddy, to chambers to ease tension in the courtroom. Cheryl Caswell, Family law judge’s pooch
provides a soothing presence, W. VA. GAZETTE (Nov. 16, 2011), http://charlestondailymail.com/
News/PutnamCounty/201111150258.
26. Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Martha Neil, State Supreme Court Administrator Won’t Pile another Complaint on Judge
in YouTube Video, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (July 3, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/state_supreme_court_administrator_wont_pile_another_complaint_on_judge_in_y/.
30. Id.
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Supreme Court announced that it decided not to look into the incident after Judge
Watkins admitted to overreacting and recused himself.31 However, in August
2012 an unrelated West Virginia Supreme Court action charged that Judge
Watkins failed to enter orders into the state’s tracking system.32 In September
2012, the Judicial Investigation Commission filed five additional charges
against Judge Watkins involving allegations of shouting at litigants and using
profanity in court.33 Judge Watkins was apparently outraged by the allegations,
blaming the alleged backlog on his caseload.34 Judge Watkins claimed the
number of divorce proceedings he oversaw was “the highest in West Virginia.”35
Even before the incident with Hage, Judge Watkins had begun taking his dog
Buddy to court with him each day to ease stress.36
Another example of a judge caught on tape yelling at lawyers or parties in a
courtroom is retired Kentucky Circuit Judge Martin McDonald.37 On the tape,
Judge McDonald can be heard admonishing an appellate lawyer during a hearing
for a new trial in a death penalty case.38 Judge McDonald told the lawyer that if
the lawyer ever called him on his cellphone again, Judge McDonald would
“strangle” him.39 When the lawyer tried to explain that the court system
provided the phone number and opposing counsel was aware he was making the
call, the judge repeatedly cut him off, calling him unethical and a “backseat
driver,” and further threatened to have the lawyer disbarred.40
According to some, judges and anger go hand in hand.41 Judging is stressful,
and some parties and lawyers certainly push judges’ buttons.42 Judges preside
over litigants who are disputatious; the environment is adversarial and often the
judge adopts the stress.43 Furthermore, judges vary in terms of their ability to
regulate their emotions.44 In addition, the legal system arguably encourages

31. Lohr, supra note 6.
32. Martha Neil, Angry Judge in YouTube Video Calls Unrelated Ethics Case re
‘Overwhelming’ Caseload ‘Infuriating’, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Aug. 13, 2012, 10:37 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/angry_judge_in_youtube_video_calls_unrelated_ethics_
case_re_overwhelmi1/.
33. Kate White, Supreme Court votes not to suspend Putnam family judge, W. VA. GAZETTE
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://wvgazette.com/News/201209070064.
34. See Neil, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Caswell, supra note 25.
37. Neil, supra note 16.
38. Id.
39. Andrew Wolfson, Judge threatens to ‘strangle’ attorney in “ridiculous” case, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.courier-journal.com/comments/article/20121003/
NEWS01/310030101/judge-threatens-strangle-attorney-ridiculous-case; Neil, supra note 16.
40. Neil, supra note 16.
41. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1208; Richmond, supra note 4, at 328–39.
42. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1232, 1238.
43. See id. at 1238–44 (describing behavior by litigants that causes judicial anger).
44. Id. at 1227–28.
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judges to abuse their authority by putting them on thrones and requiring that they
wear special robes to demonstrate power.45
Case law,46 newspapers,47 magazine articles,48 orders of sanctioning
commissions,49 and the Internet50 are rife with examples of angry judges. In
October 2012, the Houston Chronicle reported that Galveston County District
Judge Lonnie Cox yelled and cursed at a pregnant defendant appearing in his
court on a drug related charge, screaming at the woman: “This is s—-. This kind
of b———- is not what the drug court should be doing and is costing the
taxpayers money.”51 Judge Cox called the defendant “worthless” and tore up
paperwork concerning her plea arrangement before storming out of the
courtroom.52 The defendant’s attorney told the Houston Chronicle that he
planned to file a complaint about Judge Cox’s behavior with the Texas
Commission on Judicial Conduct.53
Litigants frequently file motions for recusal in response to displays of judicial
anger.54 Sometimes, courts will transfer cases to a different judge on remand or
grant a new trial because of the original trial judge’s anger.55 Additionally,
45. See Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on “Temper in the Court: A Forum on Judicial
Civility”, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 715 (1996) (citing Mark A. Neubauer, Things You Have
Wanted To Tell a Judge (But Didn’t Dare), 21 LITIG. 17, 17 (1994)).
46. See, e.g., In re Ellender, 16 So. 3d 351, 352–53 (La. 2009) (describing a judge’s
demeaning behavior towards a party during a show cause hearing); In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d 408,
413 (S.D. 2011) (discussing a judge who regularly used profanity in front of staff and attorneys);
In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 927 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (describing several allegations of
misconduct against a judge, including abusing authority and raising an appearance of impropriety).
47. See, e.g., White, supra note 25; Wolfson, supra note 37.
48. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, A Real-Life Judge Judy Gets Smacked Down, TIME (Aug. 18,
2010), www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2011494,00.html.
49. See, e.g., In re Steensland, No. 39, 2011 WL 9367406, at *1 (Ala. Jud. Inquiry Comm’n
May 2. 2011), available at http://judicial.alabama.gov/judiciary/COJ39FINALJUDG.pdf; In re
Grant, CJC No. 4952-F-131, 2006 WL 6084806, at *1, *2 (Wash. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Aug. 4,
2006),
available
at
http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/Case%20Material/2006/4952%20Grant%
20Stipulation.pdf; Public Admonition: Honorable W. Jeanne Meurer, ST. TEX. COMMISSION JUD.
CONDUCT 3 (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/actions/FY2010-PUBSANC.pdf
[hereinafter Public Admonition].
50. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
51. Rice, supra note 6.
52. Id. According to the article, the description of the event largely comes from the recusal
motion filed by the defendant’s attorney. Id. Judge Cox refused to recuse himself from the case
and referred the recusal decision to the presiding judge of the Montgomery County District Court.
Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., State v. Hasan, No. A-4395-07T4, 2009 WL 2475304, at *15–20 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2009) (affirming a lower judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion requesting
that the judge recuse himself for comments he made during a pretrial conference).
55. See, e.g., In re United States, 614 F.3d 661, 662, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2010) (denying
rehearing of an order directing the district court to admit certain exhibits into evidence and reassign
the case to a different judge, explaining that the district court judge displayed “a degree of anger
and hostility toward the government that is in excess of any provocation that we can find in the
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disciplinary tribunals, including both judicial conduct commissions and
reviewing courts, frequently sanction judges whose anger crosses the line, as all
judges are required to act in a “patient, dignified, and courteous” manner towards
all of the persons with whom the judge interacts in an official capacity.56
Judges accused of angry outbursts often defend their behavior on grounds of
judicial independence, which presumably permits a judge to adopt whatever
style leads to effective results.57 A good deal of firm, no-nonsense judicial
behavior is defensible on these grounds.58 As Justice Scalia explained in Liteky
v. United States,59 federal judges are not immune from feelings of anger,
annoyance, and impatience.60 In fact, justified and well-regulated judicial anger
can be a productive force that “does not detract unduly from the work at hand,
nor does its expression unduly disrupt either the mechanisms or image of
justice.”61
Meanwhile, striking the correct balance between disciplining improper
behavior and permitting judges to choose an effective style is critical. The public
appears to abhor judges who scream at parties in court.62 Furthermore, litigants’
perception of judicial fairness is generally based in large part on the judge’s
temperament.63 In an article concerning the rise of public criticism against the
judiciary, one commentator posits that “the simplest reform judges could take to
increase confidence in the courts would be to refrain from abusing, denigrating,
record.”); Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265, 273–74 (2d Cir. 1996)
(vacating the judgment and ordering a new trial before a different judge when the original judge
“displayed an antipathy to Santa Maria’s claim that went beyond judicial skepticism,”
cross-examined plaintiff’s expert witnesses sarcastically, and generally behaved unfairly towards
the plaintiff’s original counsel).
56. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2011). Most states have adopted some
version of this rule of conduct.
57. See, e.g., Public Admonition, supra note 49. Judge Jeanne Meurer ordered her bailiff to
lock all of the participants of a juvenile detention hearing (including the juvenile’s mother) in a
holding cell so they could experience the feeling of being “locked up.” Id. Judge Meurer defended
her conduct before the State Commission on Judicial Conduct by admitting that she got angry, but
arguing that her actions were valid because they were “‘within her authority’” and she was
attempting to achieve a settlement in the matter. Id. The Commission disagreed and publicly
admonished Judge Meurer. Id.
58. See In re Hocking, 546 N.W.2d 234, 240–41 (Mich. 1996) (explaining that not every
tasteless comment or angry outburst is considered judicial misconduct).
59. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
60. Id. at 555–56. See also People v. Stewart, No. 287286, 2010 WL 1687756, at *2 (Mich.
Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2010) (refusing to disqualify a judge for acting impatient and exasperated during
a trial).
61. Maroney, supra note 2, at 1261. Maroney claims that judicial anger can actually have
behavioral benefits, such as facilitating judgment and motivating responsive action. Id. at
1261–62.
62. See infra Part III (discussing several examples of the public’s strong reaction to displays
of anger by judges).
63. Sambhav N. Sankar, Comment, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1233, 1241–42 (2000).
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and insulting people in their writings and speech.”64 Judicial discourtesy reflects
poorly not only on the individual judge, but also on the entire judiciary.65
Research reflects that people judge procedural fairness on the basis of how
police and judges treat them, not necessarily on the outcome of a particular
experience.66 According to this “procedural justice” scholarship, the public’s
primary concerns about the police and courts involve whether they treat citizens
with dignity and respect and recognize the public’s rights and concerns.67
Therefore, “intemperate conduct by judges” leads the public to doubt the fairness
of the judge’s decision, “breed[ing] a lack of respect for . . . the judicial system
itself.”68
A judge yelling “shut up” at someone in her courtroom appears to be a
common expression of judicial anger.69 In fact, during an en banc oral argument
in 2011, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Edith Jones told her colleague,
Judge Dennis, to “shut up” as he questioned the government’s lawyer.70 Judge
Jones interrupted Judge Dennis during his questioning, saying he had
“monopolized . . . seven minutes.”71 When Judge Dennis asked if he could
continue with his questioning, Judge Jones asked if he would like to leave, and
told him she wanted him to “shut up.”72 Judge Dennis responded, saying,
“[d]on’t tell me to shut up.”73
Although a judge silencing a party or lawyer by demanding she “shut up” does
not necessarily show bias on the judge’s part, it does affect the public’s
perception of whether the proceeding is just.74 Commentators identify certain
factors as impacting perceptions of procedural fairness, such as: “(1) whether
the people involved had an opportunity to state their case (“voice”); (2) whether
the authorities were seen as unbiased, honest, and principled (“neutrality”); (3)
64. Tobin A. Sparling, Through Different Lenses: Using Psychology to Assess Popular
Criticism of the Judiciary from the Public’s Perspective, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 471, 500
(2010).
65. Id.
66. Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 215,
215 (2001). See also Hafemeister, Garner & Bath, supra note 17, at 200.
67. Tyler, supra note 66, at 216.
68. Paul L. Friedman, Taking the High Road: Civility, Judicial Independence, and the Rule
of Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 198 (2001).
69. See, e.g., Council, supra note 24. See also David Lat, Judicial Diva Gone Wild? Chief
Judge Jones Tells Judge Dennis to ‘Shut Up’, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 21, 2011, 7:43 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/09/benchslap-of-the-day-chief-judge-jones-tells-judge-dennist-toshut-up/; Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16.
70. Council, supra note 24.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Sankar, supra note 63, at 1241–42 (explaining that the public’s perception of the
fairness of proceedings stems largely from how people are treated by authorities; authorities’
demeanor plays a substantial role in this perception).
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whether the authorities were seen as benevolent and caring (“trustworthiness”);
and (4) whether the people involved were treated with dignity and respect.”75
Accordingly, a judge silencing a party in anger, even if doing so does not impact
the judge’s decision, will probably impact the party’s perception of the
proceeding’s fairness.
Arguably, the answer to excessive displays of judicial anger is harsher
disciplinary action from judicial conduct commissions and courts, the tribunals
charged with correcting judicial misbehavior.76 One commentator has argued
that failure to meaningfully discipline judges who commit serious acts of
misconduct discourages litigants from reporting such behavior to the proper
authorities.77 For example, the commentator states that a public reprimand and
$100.00 fine is clearly an insufficient punishment for a particularly egregious
case of judicial bullying and instead recommends suspension without pay or
removal.78
Currently, judicial sanctioning tribunals discipline the worst judicial
demeanor cases with public sanctions or, less frequently, removal.79 However,
a public reprimand is arguably inadequate to correct a bullying judge’s behavior,
but not because of the sanction’s leniency. Rather, the publicity is likely to
stigmatize the judge, potentially increasing the judge’s hostility, without
providing any real behavioral correction.
II. TO MORE EFFECTIVELY PROTECT THE PUBLIC, DISCIPLINE SHOULD NOT
STIGMATIZE THE ANGRY JUDGE
Apart from removal of a judge by involuntary resignation, the harshest forms
of discipline are public. Many judicial conduct commissions list on their
websites the names and offenses of judges who receive public sanctions.80
Public sanctions satisfy those who seek transparency in judicial discipline, but

75. Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 479 (2009). See
also Singer, supra note 17, at 1458 (“At the trial court level, where citizens are more likely to
experience the courts directly, expectations of procedural justice include fair and dignified
treatment, personal participation or control over some aspect of the proceedings, the opportunity to
be heard, trustworthiness, and neutrality.”) (citations omitted).
76. See Richmond, supra note 4, at 360.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d 408, 421 (S.D. 2011) (noting that states impose various
punishments for serious judicial misconduct, ranging from public censure to suspension or
removal). In the case of South Dakota Judge Pete Fuller, who gave a lawyer “the finger” during a
court proceeding and routinely swore in open court, the Supreme Court of South Dakota ordered
that the judge be involuntarily retired. Id. at 413–14, 421. However, the court provided that his
retirement could be stayed if he met certain conditions. Id. at 421–22.
80. See, e.g., Disciplinary Action, TEX. ST. COMM’N ON JUD. CONDUCT, http://www.scjc.
state.tx.us/actions.asp (last updated Jan. 29, 2014). Public Discipline & Decisions 1961-Present,
ST. CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, http://cjp.ca.gov/pub_discipline_and_decisions.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
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are likely to shame the offending judge.81 Many consider this result to be the
primary virtue of public discipline. However, the social science research
suggests that shaming an already angry judge is likely to increase her anger and
hostility, rather than motivate positive behavioral changes.82 This is especially
true today because of the social media effect described in Part IV, which
exacerbates the judge’s shame by inviting the public’s reaction to the judge.
Arguably, private sanctions, like removal, may also cause the judge to feel
shame, as the discipline is meant to express the commission’s disapproval of the
offending judge’s conduct.83 Therefore, although the disciplinary tribunal’s
express purpose is not to humiliate the judge, shame is a likely by-product of
such sanctions.84
Some believe that shaming an angry judge will incentivize her future good
behavior and the good behavior of those judges who observe the public shaming.

81. Some judges are not shame-prone and are therefore unlikely to experience shame as a
result of a commission or newspaper publicizing their wrongdoing. C.f. infra notes 93–100 and
accompanying text (discussing the consequences of being shame-prone). Arguably, however, most
judges suffer humiliation or shame as a result of public discipline. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 636 (1996) (noting that, generally speaking,
“offenders punished by shaming penalties are likely to feel shame.”).
82. See infra notes 93–100 and accompanying text (exploring research on the effects of
shame).
83. Removal is the most severe form of discipline. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 384 (1997). See also Spruance v. Comm’n
on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1225 (Cal. 1975) (en banc). In rejecting the lesser
discipline of a public censure and mandating removal of a judge who participated in ex parte
communications in criminal cases and made improper comments about counsel, the California
Supreme Court noted that “[m]ere censure of petitioner would woefully fail to convey our utter
reproval of any judge who allows malice or other improper personal motivations to infect the
administration of justice.” Fletcher v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958, 991 (Cal.
1998) (quoting Spruance, 532 P.2d at 1225).
84. Although public discipline imposed on judges is not typically referred to as a “shaming
penalty,” this discipline shares key attributes with shaming penalties. With public discipline, the
judge’s name, misconduct, and discipline are publicized to express the commission’s condemnation
of the behavior, as well as to invite some level of public participation in the condemnation.
Similarly, shaming penalties are “designed to humiliate and degrade an offender in public while
inviting some element of public participation in that humiliation and degradation.” Dan Markel,
Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of Shaming
Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1389–90 (2007). In both instances,
the discipline’s added heft comes from the humiliation the offenders presumably suffer from the
public response. Despite the legal community’s rejection of shaming penalties as an effective
means of correction in the criminal law context (which is meant to be punitive), publicizing
misbehavior remains one of the harshest forms of discipline that is imposed on misbehaving judges
(which is not meant to be punitive). According to disciplinary tribunals, the purpose of imposing
judicial discipline is generally to protect the public and ensure the integrity of the judiciary. See,
e.g., Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1271 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Furey
v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 743 P.2d 919, 931 (Cal. 1987)) (“‘The purpose of these
proceedings is not to punish errant judges but to protect the judicial system and those subject to the
awesome power that judges wield.’”).
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However, social science suggests that shame has few benefits.85 In fact, shame
might actually cause a judge to feel deeper hostility and anger, and prevent
empathic responses from the judge.86 The once angry judge then becomes the
deeply isolated and resentful judge.87
A. What is Shame, and How Does it Impact Judges?
Shame is defined as “a painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt,
shortcoming, or impropriety.”88 It is a self-conscious emotion in that it involves
“self evaluating the self.”89 The experiences of shame and guilt differ in that
shamed individuals feel small and worthless and want to hide or regress, whereas
the guilty feel tense and remorseful about their behavior.90
Shameful feelings may motivate prosocial behavior by reinforcing group
values and thus ensuring that the members of the group conduct themselves
appropriately.91 Shame also stimulates many types of goal-seeking behavior,
some of which are socially valuable.92
For those who are shame-prone,93 however, shame can certainly backfire with
the offender reacting in anger to discipline that shames.94 According to June
Tangney, a psychology professor who has researched and written extensively on
shame and guilt, those who are shame-prone “appear relatively more likely to
blame others (as well as themselves) for negative events, more prone to a
85. See JUNE PRICE TANGNEY & RONDA L. DEARING, SHAME AND GUILT 137 (2002) (noting
that their results demonstrated that “no apparent benefit was derived from the pain of shame [and]
[t]here was no evidence that shame inhibits problematic behaviors”)
86. See id. at 97 (“[S]hame can also motivate defensive feelings of anger and hostility, and a
tendency to project blame outward.”).
87. See id. at 103 (explaining that shame-prone individuals are also likely to be easily
angered).
88. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1073 (10th ed. 2002). Professor
Martha Nussbaum defines shame as a feeling of inadequacy, specifically “a painful emotion
responding to a sense of failure to attain some ideal state.” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM
HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 184 (2004). Other commentators have explained
that shame “is an extremely painful and ugly feeling that has a negative impact on interpersonal
behavior.” TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 3. Embarrassment has been described as a
less dramatic and less enduring version of shame. Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame:
Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 668 (1997).
89. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 2.
90. Id. at 18–19.
91. BROCK HANSEN, SHAME AND ANGER: THE CRITICISM CONNECTION 29 (2006). See also
Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 211 (“[S]hame can at times be a morally valuable emotion, playing a
constructive role in development and moral change.”).
92. Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 206.
93. See June Price Tangney, Kerstin Youman & Jeffrey Stuewig, Proneness to Shame and
Proneness to Guilt, in HANDBOOK OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 192, 192
(Mark R. Leary & Rick H. Hoye eds., 2009) (“Shame proneness and guilt proneness are stable
personality dispositions representing the propensity to experience these moral emotions across time
and situations.”).
94. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 3.
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seething, bitter, resentful kind of anger and hostility, and less able to empathize
with others in general.”95 Other social science research also suggests a robust
correlation between shame-proneness and anger.96
Less shame-prone
individuals are more likely to use their anger in a constructive manner than are
their shame-prone counterparts.97 In addition, Tangney posits that shame can
hinder an empathetic response to another’s feelings.98 This occurs as a result of
the individual’s intense focus on his or her self, which diverts attention from
others who may have been hurt by the individual’s behavior.99 The shamed are
unlikely to accept responsibility for their misbehavior or attempt to regain the
trust of those whom they wronged.100
A person’s response to shame depends in part on whether the shame is
delivered in either a stigmatizing or reintegrative way.101 In the criminal context,
stigmatizing shame refers to shame that focuses on the person, rather than on the
behavior.102 This type of shaming labels the offender a deviant and makes no
effort to de-label or reintegrate the person into his community.103 Reintegrative
shaming, on the other hand, refers to “expressions of community disapproval,
which may range from mild rebuke to degradation ceremonies, [that] are
followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community of law-abiding
citizens.”104 Rather than reintegrating an individual, publicizing discipline tends
to stigmatize an offender.105 For example, Tangney explains that in the
schoolroom context, methods of discipline such as putting students in the corner
or writing their names on the chalkboard lead to public humiliation and

95. Id.
96. Jeffrey Stuewig, June P. Tangney, Caron Heigel, Laura Harty & Laura McCloskey,
Shaming, Blaming, and Maiming: Functional Links Among the Moral Emotions, Externalization of
Blame, and Aggression, 44 J. RES. PERSONALITY, 91, 92 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2848360/.
97. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 103–04 (explaining that a shame-prone
individual is likely to engage in aggressive behavior and is not typically inclined to engage in a
constructive conversation about the behavior with the target of their anger). See also Tangney,
Youman & Stuewig, supra note 93, at 200 (noting that “[p]eople suffering from the pain and
self-diminishment of shame may become defensive and angry and attempt to deflect blame
outward.”).
98. TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 81 (stating that “shame can actually interfere
with an other-oriented empathetic connection.”).
99. Id. at 83.
100. See Maxine D. Goodman, Removing the Umpire’s Mask: The Propriety and Impact of
Judicial Apologies, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1529, 1555–57 (2011) (providing examples of judges who
apologized for wrongdoing by saying some variation of, “If my behavior offended anyone, I
apologize.”).
101. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 55 (1989).
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 85, at 187–88.
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stigmatization of the student.106 Similarly, judicial sanctioning tribunals can
stigmatize judges by imposing public reprimands for serious and repeated angry
behavior; these tribunals often post the judges’ names, offenses committed, and
discipline on a “list of shame” on their websites.107
B. Exploring the Theory Behind Shaming Penalties in the Context of Judicial
Discipline
Many write about shaming penalties in the criminal law context.108 These
penalties typically involve broadcasting an offender’s crime in order to “provoke
communal outrage.”109 Examples of shaming penalties include requiring a
defendant convicted of killing a man while driving drunk to stand at the crash
scene wearing a sign saying “I killed Aaron Coy Pennywell While Driving
Drunk”110 or requiring convicted shoplifters to run advertisements in their local
newspapers providing their photographs and the crimes they committed.111 A
Utah juvenile court judge recently agreed to reduce a thirteen-year-old girl’s
community service for cutting several inches of hair from a three-year-old’s
head if the girl agreed to have her ponytail cut off in court.112 Recently, a judge
106. Id. at 188.
107. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Often, the same angry judge receives more
than one public reprimand. See STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, SUMMARY
OF DISCIPLINE STATISTICS 1990-2009 (2009) available at http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/
Miscellaneous/Statistical_Report_1990-2009.pdf (“Judges who had prior discipline were more
likely to be disciplined again than judges who had not been disciplined . . . . [F]rom 2000 to 2009,
55.7 percent of all discipline was imposed on previously disciplined judges.”). The most common
type of misconduct for which the Commission imposed discipline was demeanor/decorum. Id. at
14. Judges may need to be reprimanded more than once because of the stigma that results from
public discipline; as commentators have suggested, shaming penalties might lead to greater anger
and hostility on the part of the angry judge.
108. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1088 n.167 (2009) (noting that prominent
scholars have mixed viewpoints on the virtues of shaming penalties).
109. Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for the Increased
Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188 (2005). See also Markel,
supra note 84, at 1389–90 (“Shaming punishments . . . are penalties designed to humiliate and
degrade an offender in public while inviting some element of public participation in that humiliation
and degradation.”).
110. See Robert Stanton, Drunken driver must wear sign about his crime, HOUS. CHRON., Apr.
21, 2012, at B3; Texas judge orders convicted drunk driver to public humiliation, FOX NEWS (Apr.
21, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/21/texas-judge-orders-convicted-drunk-driver-topublic-humiliation.
111. See Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1997, at A1.
112. Lynn DeBruin, ‘Shame’ punishments like ponytail cutting increase, SEATTLE TIMES (June
25, 2012, 5:50 AM), http://seattletimes.com/avantgo/2018522313.html. The teen’s mother filed a
complaint against the judge with the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission. Id.; Matthew
Rosenbaum, Haircuts to Signs: Public Shaming to Make Kids Straighten Up, ABC NEWS (June 26,
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/Parenting/haircuts-signs-public-shaming-make-kids-straighten/
print?id=16655358.
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ordered a woman who drove on the sidewalk to avoid stopping behind a school
bus to stand at the intersection where the bus stopped while wearing a sign
saying, “[o]nly an idiot drives on the sidewalk to avoid a school bus.”113
Obviously, publicizing a judge’s wrongdoing differs from ordering an
offender to stand on a street corner with a sign, advertising his offense. In the
latter scenario, the offender physically bears the stigma as he publicizes his
wrongdoing, whereas judges are removed from the public and thus can bear their
stigma in private. In Professor Dan Kahan’s continuum of shaming penalties,
publicizing a judge’s wrongdoing constitutes “stigmatizing publicity,” much
like identifying sex offenders on websites or in advertisements.114 Stigmatizing
publicity seeks “to magnify the humiliation inherent in conviction by
communicating the offender’s status to a wider audience.”115 Publicity adds a
level of severity to discipline that private corrections lack. Because many judges
are elected and thus rely heavily on their professional reputations, bad publicity
can certainly affect their standing among their peers and possibly even their
livelihoods.
Commentators have outlined the virtues and vices of shaming penalties in the
criminal law arena.116 Proponents of shaming penalties for criminal defendants
contend that these penalties serve as a valuable alternative to incarceration at a
time when prison overcrowding presents challenges for the criminal justice
system.117 Thus, in terms of economics, punishment without imprisonment
makes sense.118 Others contend that shaming is actually less degrading than
imprisonment.119 Shaming punishments are also offered as a viable alternative
to jail because they serve an expressive function, displaying the public’s
disapproval of the criminal’s conduct, without inflicting physical harm.120

113. Philip Caulfield, Judge orders cleveland woman to wear an ‘idiot’ sign after she was
caught driving on a sidewalk to avoid a school bus, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:59 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/woman-wear-idiot-sign-traffic-gaffe-article1.1197276.
114. See Kahan, supra note 81, at 631–32.
115. Id.
116. See Gershowitz, supra note 108, at 1089–95; Kahan, supra note 81, at 644–46.
117. See Kahan, supra note 81, at 635 (“Much of the appeal [of shaming penalties] is simply
that they are cheaper than imprisonment.”).
118. See Markel, supra note 84, at 1388–89; Aaron S. Book, Note, Shame on You: An Analysis
of Modern Shame Punishment as an Alternative to Incarceration, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653,
680–81 (1999). Commentators agree on this issue, regardless of their position on shaming
penalties.
119. Dan M. Kahan, Postscript, Unthinkable Misrepresentations: A Response to Tonry, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1933, 1935 (1999).
120. Chad Flanders, Essay, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
609, 611–12 (2006). See also Kahan, supra note 81, at 635 (explaining that, unlike imprisonment,
shaming penalties “express appropriate moral condemnation”); Massaro, supra note 88, at 649
(stating that “[s]haming will clearly promote one end: communicating the shamer’s disgust for the
offender and offense”).
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Yet, commentators also challenge the effectiveness and morality of these
penalties.121 Professor Dan Kahan, once a proponent of shaming penalties, now
recognizes that shame “is afflicted with a social meaning handicap that, as a
practical matter, makes it an unacceptable alternate sanction.”122 Thus, Kahan’s
argument goes, the penalties, if meted out, reflect unacceptable partisanship.123
Commentators also object to the effectiveness of these sanctions on
psychological and sociological grounds, contending that shaming may not lead
to a defendant’s rehabilitation and specific deterrence, but rather to retaliation
and anger.124 Given this shame-anger cycle, those who advocate shaming
penalties do so only for nonviolent criminals because they believe that “[t]o
force a violent offender to undergo public humiliation likely would lead to more
violence.”125
Furthermore, the effectiveness of shaming depends on several variables,
including both the personality of the offender and the community in which the
penalty is imposed, making the penalties’ value unpredictable.126 The
“shameless” will not feel the impact, whereas the shame-prone may react with
anger to the discipline.127 The effectiveness of shaming penalties “depends on
an offender having attachments to others in whose eyes he or she can, as a result
of those attachments, suffer shame.”128 Therefore, an offender without
attachments will not feel shamed, despite being admonished for his
wrongdoing.129 However, Toni Massaro explains that traditional shaming
penalties have unpredictable behavioral consequences that “may include anger
and a desire to retaliate against the one inflicting shame.”130 Massaro also warns
against shaming proponents’ “relative indifference” to this unpredictability.131
In summary, commentators do advocate for shaming to correct behavior in other

121. See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2216 (2001)
(arguing that shaming penalties are misguided as corrections when the goal is retributive because
the state, not the public, is meant to impose punishment); NUSSBAUM, supra note 88, at 229–30
(noting that one criticism of shaming penalties is that they strip offenders of their dignity).
122. Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075,
2075–76 (2006).
123. See id.
124. Massaro, supra note 88, at 648. But see Book, supra note 118, at 675 (stating that shaming
has been shown to be psychologically effective).
125. Book, supra note 118, at 683–84.
126. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1811 (2001)
(explaining that “[s]haming sanctions work best in close-knit communities in which citizens
interact frequently and share common values”).
127. See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733,
748–49 (1998).
128. Id. at 748.
129. Id. at 784–49.
130. Massaro, supra note 88, at 648.
131. Id.
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areas of the law,132 yet, on balance, recent scholarship weighs against shaming
penalties in the criminal arena.
The lessons derived from the use of shaming penalties in other contexts
suggest that disciplining an angry judge with public sanctions might exacerbate
the judge’s anger and hostility. The goal of sanctioning judges is not to punish
the offending judge, but rather to protect the public, which often includes
rehabilitating the judge, and attempting to deter future wrongdoing.133 The
consequences of shaming a judge who has engaged in particularly egregious or
repeated displays of hostility are unpredictable at best,134 and destructive at
worst.135
Commentators who advocate for using shame in discipline often do so in the
context of restorative justice where the shame is reintegrative. Reintegrative
shame involves an initial expression of disapproval of the behavior rather than
the offender, and focuses on reintegrating the offender into his community.136
This approach requires a process that the offender feels is just and one that
surrounds the offender with members of his community.137 The path to
restorative justice is completely unlike the typical judicial disciplinary process
in which a judicial conduct commission, typically made up of judges, lawyers,
and non-lawyers, prosecutes the dispute in an adversarial setting.138 Shame from
the judicial disciplinary process, exacerbated by the social media effect, is thus
isolating, not reintegrative.
C. Potential Virtues of Shaming Penalties for Judges
Some may contend that public sanctions like shaming are fitting for judges
because they are the only type of discipline that will get their attention. In light
132. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 108, at 1062–63 (arguing that courts should publicize
the names of prosecutors who engage in misconduct because without such public shaming,
prosecutors experience little pressure to act appropriately); Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming
Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 664 (2011) (arguing that small businesses should use
shaming to both punish trademark bullies and deter others from engaging in similar behavior);
Skeel, supra note 126, at 1812–13 (explaining that the shaming of corporations, both by the courts
and private entities, is particularly effective because corporations and their directors have very
strong interests in their reputations).
133. See In re Hocking, 546 N.W.2d 234, 245 (Mich. 1996) (“[O]ur primary charge is to
fashion a penalty that maintains the honor and the integrity of the judiciary, deters similar conduct,
and furthers the administration of justice . . . . We must carefully maintain the distinction between
protection and punishment.”).
134. See Massaro, supra note 88, at 648.
135. See Susan Hanley Duncan, Restorative Justice and Bullying: A Missing Solution in the
Anti-Bullying Laws, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 285–86 (2011).
136. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 101, at 55.
137. Id. (noting that “[t]he nub of this deterrence is not the severity of the sanction but its social
embeddedness; shame is more deterring when administered by persons who continue to be of
importance to us.”).
138. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organizations, 76 KY. L.J. 811, 811–12
(1988) (explaining the basic structure of most judicial conduct systems).
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of the heavy emphasis on judge’s reputations, the argument goes, public
sanctions should motivate prosocial behavior by judges. Along the same lines,
some may argue that the social media effect, which can produce results ranging
from harsh public criticism to death threats, is fitting punishment because the
angry judge deserves whatever collateral, unintended consequences flow from
the discipline. Additionally, as individuals concerned with their public image,
judges may be more impacted by their community’s negative perception of
them, making rehabilitative justice more appropriate for them than it is for bluecollar criminals.139
However, anecdotal evidence does not support the idea that shaming a judge
will reform her angry behavior,140 and empirical evidence is scarce.141
Additionally, if the goal of judicial discipline is as disciplinary tribunals say it
is — to protect the public, not punish the offender142 — this argument fails. For
ordinary criminals, discipline is meant to punish, and discipline has well-known
objectives including deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation
(for incarceration).143 But for judicial discipline to meet its objective of guiding
judges and protecting the public, it should not be assessed by the extent of the
judge’s humiliation as a result of his misconduct but rather by the discipline’s
effectiveness in correcting the judge’s angry behavior.

139. C.f. Mirela V. Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading Criminalization and Sentencing
Reform, 13 TRANSACTIONS 267, 268 (2012).
140. The available anecdotal evidence includes several examples of angry judges who continue
to display anger in the courtroom, despite being sanctioned. For instance, King County District
Court Judge Judith Eiler became notorious for her hostile behavior, particularly toward pro se
litigants. See In re Eiler, 236 P.3d 873, 874–75 (Wash. 2010) (en banc). Over the course of about
eight years, Judge Eiler was accused of repeatedly addressing litigants in a rude and condescending
manner. Id. at 875. On August 5, 2010, the Washington Supreme Court of Washington suspended
Judge Eiler for five days without pay. Id. Five years before her 2010 suspension, Judge Eiler had
been reprimanded for exhibiting similarly hostile behavior. Id. The judicial conduct commission
that investigated the 2010 case censured Judge Eiler and recommended a ninety day unpaid
suspension. Id. In rejecting the recommendation and instead imposing a five-day suspension, the
Washington Supreme Court noted the ineffectiveness of the 2005 discipline in motivating Judge
Eiler to adjust her courtroom demeanor, and acknowledged the severity of a ninety-day suspension.
Id. at 882. In any event, the court ultimately held that “[i]t [was] clear that a second reprimand or
censure without any suspension at all would [have been] too lenient.” Id.
141. See Abel, supra note 12, at 1031–33 (noting the lack of empirical data on judicial
discipline).
142. See, e.g., In re Davis, 82 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2002) (“However, we are
not charged with punishing but with providing guidance to judges and protection to the public.”).
143. See Forst, supra note 10, at 1262 (noting that the typical objectives of criminal punishment
include deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation). According to Jeremy Bentham,
“[t]he immediate principal end of punishment is to control action.” JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170 (1963).
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III. THE SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECT
Today, transparency is “in,”144 and commentators, including lawyers and the
public, have criticized the secretive nature of judicial discipline proceedings.145
In a democracy, the argument goes, the public is entitled to know about the
behavior of its public figures.146 This argument is particularly compelling when
judges are elected, as most state court judges are.147
Yet, regardless of what sanction a judicial conduct tribunal imposes (or
sometimes even before a sanctioning tribunal gets involved), judges’ angry
outbursts will often be publicized via social media because of the public’s
fascination with misbehaving judges.148 The lack of transparency of formal
judiciary disciplinary proceedings is often remedied by informal means.
Websites such as RobeProbe,149 Above the Law,150 Citizens for Legal
Responsibility,151 Citizens for Judicial Accountability,152 and Very Bad
Judges153 are devoted to documenting and publicizing judicial behavior.
This phenomenon is changing the disciplinary landscape in terms of not only
what the public knows about judges, but also the consequences of judges’
misbehavior. Arguably, as a result of the social media effect, the judge suffers
the impact of public criticism in addition to any discipline for wrongdoing. For
those judges who are elected officials, the media attention can have very real
consequences, including a loss of livelihood.154 For the shame-prone judge, this

144. See, e.g., MARTY MAKARY, UNACCOUNTABLE 5–6 (2012) (advocating for greater
transparency in the health care industry in order to improve hospital practices); DON TAPSCOTT &
DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION: HOW THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY WILL
REVOLUTIONIZE BUSINESS xi–xv (2003) (highlighting the value of corporate transparency).
145. See Glenn Puit, ACLU Lawsuit: Secrecy of Judicial Complaints Targeted, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J. Nov. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 440316; supra note 5 and accompanying text.
146. See David A. Harris, Essay, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional
Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785,
794–95 (1993) (citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 1–3 (1949)).
147. Most states elect at least some of their judges. Sankar, supra note 63, at 1250.
148. See The Honorable Dana M. Levitz, So, You Think You Want to Be a Judge, 38 U. BALT.
L. REV. 57, 57 (2008) (“The American public is fascinated by judges. How else do you explain
Judge Wapner, Judge Ed Koch, Judge Judy, Judge Roy Brown, Judge Joe Brown, Judge Hatchett,
etc.?”).
149. About, ROBEPROBE, http://robeprobe.com/about.php (last visited Apr. 6 2014) referring
to itself as the “[w]orld’s most trusted judge rating site.”).
150. About, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
151. CITIZENS FOR LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://clr.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
152. CITIZENS FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.judicialaccountability.net (last
visited Apr. 6, 2014). This website claims to expose “the denial of fundamental rights by judges
and lawyers who place themselves not only above the law, but beyond the law . . . .” Id.
153. VERY BAD JUDGES, http://verybadjudges.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
154. See, e.g., Judicial Elections-Alhambra Municipal Court-Michael A. Kanner and Dennis
Orfirer-Election Challenger Orfirer Points to Judge Kanner’s Public Reproval, METROPOLITAN
NEWS COMPANY (Jan. 25, 1996), http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmp
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stigmatizing publicity would certainly exacerbate the impact of any shame
flowing from the judge’s misdeeds, as the public’s response often targets the
judge himself, not just the judge’s misdeeds.155
A. Case Studies Demonstrating the Impact of the Social Media Effect
In the instances described below, the public not only learned of the judge’s
behavior through means other than public discipline by a judicial conduct
commission, but also appeared to drive the disciplinary process. These three
examples illustrate the social media effect: the role social media and the press
play in stigmatizing the judge and in affecting the formal disciplinary process.
1. Judge William Adams
In 2011, Aransas County, Texas Court-at-Law Judge William Adams gained
notoriety when his twenty-three-year-old daughter posted a video on YouTube
showing the judge violently beating her with a belt.156 After the tape “went
viral” on YouTube, getting over 7 million hits,157 the Texas Supreme Court
suspended Judge Adams indefinitely with pay, and the Texas State Commission
on Judicial Conduct commenced an investigation into Judge Adams’ alleged
wrongdoing.158 The public’s reaction was immediate and wide reaching. Judge

FBSel=all&totaldocs (describing a situation in which a lawyer attempted to defeat a judicial
election by publicizing a commission’s reproval of the judge). See also Judge Michael Kanner
Says He Won’t Seek Reelection, METROPOLITAN NEWS COMPANY (Oct. 22, 2001),
http://www.metnews.com/articles/kann102201.htm (explaining that the judge ultimately won
reelection, but the race was “hotly contested”). But see infra notes 170–85 (describing the
sanctioning of Judge Sharon Keller and how she came to remain on the bench following the
negative findings of a judicial commission).
155. See TANGNEY & DEARING, supra note 93, at 103–04 (highlighting the link between
shame-proneness and anger).
156. See Ruling Against Judge Seen Beating Daughter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/us/ruling-against-judge-seen-beating-daughter.html?_r=0.
The public did not learn of this incident via angry courtroom behavior or a complaint filed against
the judge, but rather from the online posting.
157. See Shoehedgie, Judge William Adams beats daughter for using the internet . . .,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wl9y3SIPt7o. An Aransas County
attorney told the press that when Judge Adams’ daughter posted the video, Judge Adams’ office
was inundated with emails and calls, including some from outside the United States. Joe Sutton &
Ed Payne, Judge In Video Beating Seeks Reinstatement; Ex-Wife Is Opposed, FOX 2 NOW (Oct. 4,
2012, 11:55 AM), http://fox2now.com/2012/10/04/judge-in-video-beating-seeks-reinstatement-exwife-is-opposed/.
158. See Sutton & Payne, supra note 157.
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Adams received death threats,159 and protestors demanded that he resign.160 Due
in part to the public outcry, the judicial conduct commission released a public
statement explaining that it was investigating the matter and asking that no
additional complaints be filed.161
Ultimately, the commission disciplined Judge Adams with a public warning
because the videotape “cast reasonable doubt on his capacity to act impartially
as a judge and interfered with the proper performance of his judicial
duties . . . .”162 In addition, the commission referenced the testimony of attorneys
who regularly practiced before Judge Adams, describing incidents in which he
lost his temper at lawyers in his courtroom, specifically the former Aransas
County Attorney.163 The commission concluded that Judge Adams violated
Canons 3B(4) and 4A of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as
Article V, § 1-a(6)A of the Texas Constitution.164
Today, Judge Adams is back on the bench, serving the remainder of his term
that will end in in 2014;165 the Texas Supreme Court reinstated him after he
agreed not to challenge the public warning.166 In terms of the public’s response
to Judge Adams, a Facebook page titled “Don’t Re-elect Judge William Adams”
has attracted more than 31,000 likes167 and a page titled “Prosecute Judge

159. Jon Bershad, After Police Investigation Open, Texas Judge Response To Beating Video:
‘It’s Not As Bad As It Looks On Tape’, MEDIAITE (Nov. 2, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.mediaite.
com/online/after-police-investigation-opens-texas-judge-responds-to-beating-video-its-not-asbad-as-it-looks-on-tape/.
160. Daniel Tovrov, Judge William Adams: Protesters Demand Judge’s Resignation,
INTERNATIONAL BUS. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/judge-williamadams-protesters-demand-judges-resignation-366896.
161. Public Statement: No. PS-2012-1, Tex. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct (Nov. 2, 2011),
available at http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/PublicStatement.pdf.
162. Public Warning: Honorable William Adams County Court at Law Judge Rockport,
Aransas County, Texas, Tex. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct (Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Texas Constitution permits judicial discipline in response to “willful or persistent
conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the proper performance of [a judge’s] duties or casts public
discredit upon the judiciary or the administration of justice.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1-a(6)(A).
165. Judge suspended in video beating returns to bench, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 11, 2012),
http://www.chron/com/neighborhood//news/houston-texas/article/Suspension-lifted-for-judgewho-beat-daughter-4013671.php; Texas judge suspended after video showed him beating his
daughter returns to bench, FOX NEWS (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/11/14/
texas-judge-suspended-after-video-showed-him-beating-daughter-returns-to-bench.
166. Approval of Agreed Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Judge, No. 12-9137 (Tex.
Nov. 6, 2012). Judge Adams’ former wife has publicly opposed his returning to the bench, telling
the press that she wants to “protect the public from being judged by a person that I feel does not
have the capacity to act fairly and effectively as a judge as evidence[d] [by] how he has treated his
own family over the years.” Sutton & Payne, supra note 157.
167. Don’t Re-Elect Judge William Adams, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/
Dont-Re-Elect-Judge-Wlliam-Adams/217089511694481 (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
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William Adams” has over 700 likes.168 Because of the threats the judge received
after the video was released, the Aransas County courthouse where Judge Adams
presides now has additional security, including metal detectors at the building’s
entrance.169
2. Judge Sharon Keller
In another example of a strong public reaction to judicial behavior, on
September 25, 2007, Judge Sharon Keller, then the Presiding Judge of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, infamously refused to keep her clerk’s office open
outside business hours, even though late filings are typical on days when
executions are scheduled.170 As a result of her refusal, lawyers for Michael
Richard were unable to file a last-minute appeal and Richard was executed later
that night.171
In February 2009, the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct sent
Judge Keller a notice advising her that the Commission had initiated formal
proceedings against her as a result of the incident.172 The Texas Supreme Court
appointed Texas State District Court Judge David Berchelmann, Jr. as Special
Master to conduct the necessary hearings and make a recommendation to the
commission on the matter.173 Following a hearing, the Special Master concluded
that although Judge Keller’s conduct was not exemplary, she did not engage in
conduct so egregious to warrant removal from office.174 The Special Master also
remarked that her actions did not warrant any sanction “beyond the public
humiliation she has surely suffered.”175
In June 2010, the commission disregarded the Special Master’s conclusions
and voted to impose a public warning against Judge Keller, finding that she
committed several violations of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Code of
Judicial Conduct, including “willful or persistent conduct that casts public
discredit on the judiciary.”176 However, a Special Court of Review reversed this
decision on the grounds that the commission lacked the authority to impose this

168. Prosecute Judge William Adams, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/
prosecute-Judge-William-Adams/235101293218440 (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
169. Texas judge suspended after video showed him beating daughter returns to bench, supra
note 165.
170. Gretel C. Kovach, A Texas Judge, Accused of Misconduct, Draws Mixed Opinions on Her
Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at A14.
171. Id.
172. In re Keller, No. 10-0001, at 2 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. Oct. 11, 2010), available at
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/tx/20101011_Final_Opinion.pdf.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 5–7.
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sanction under the Texas Constitution.177 Therefore, the Special Court of
Review vacated the commission’s order and dismissed the commission’s
charging document against Judge Keller.178
Judge Keller’s actions and the resulting disciplinary action received a
substantial amount of press. Not only did individuals weigh in on the case
against Judge Keller, but organized groups protested her conduct, her continued
tenure on the bench, and the commission’s actions and decisions. For example,
in a novel type of pleading, a group of twenty-four “judicial ethics experts”
submitted an “Ethics Experts’ Declaration” to the commission during the
pendency of the proceeding,179 alleging Judge Keller violated judicial ethical
rules by “deciding cases despite her lack of impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality, which required that she recuse herself . . . .”180 A separate group of
individuals from the Texas Moratorium Network created a website,
“sharonkiller.com,” aimed at notifying the public of Judge Keller’s conduct and
the commission’s response.181
On June 26, 2012, several former presidents of the Texas Criminal Defense
Lawyers Association posted an article on the Huffington Riposte blog, urging
readers to contribute to the campaign of Judge Keller’s opponent, Keith
Hampton.182 The blog states that Judge Keller “brought national embarrassment
to the Texas judiciary and legal system” when she refused to keep her clerk’s
office open late on the date of Richard’s execution.183 On November 6, 2012,
Judge Keller won reelection to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.184

177. Id. at 34–35. Pursuant to the Texas Constitution and Code, the only available remedy was
to dismiss the charging document; issuing a public warning was not available to the commission as
a sanction. Id.
178. Id. at 35.
179. Mary Alice Robbins, Ethics Experts Claim CCA Presiding Judge Sharon Keller Should
Go, TEX. LAW., (Apr. 27, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202430175566.
The commission did not solicit the Declaration and was unfamiliar with this type of submission.
Id.
180. Ethics Experts’ Declaration at 1, Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 96 (Tex. State Comm’n
Judicial Conduct Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/tx/TEXAS.pdf.
181. Sharon Keller Gets off on Technicality; Reputation of Texas Judiciary Still Tarnished,
SHARONKILLER.COM, http://sharonkiller.com/ (last visited May 14, 2014). The home page argues
that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should impeach Judge Keller and remove her from office.
Id.
182. Presiding Judge Sharon Keller Must Go!, HUFFINGTON RIPOSTE (June 26, 2012),
huffingtonriposte.blogspot.com/2012/06/presiding-judge-sharon-keller-must-go.html.
183. Id.
184. Terrence Stutz, Sharon Keller re-elected to Texas criminal appeals court; Geraldine
Miller leads in education board race, DALLAS NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:38 PM),
www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-politics/20121106-sharon-keller-re-elected. According
to Keller, death penalty opponents protested at her house and she received “at least one credible
death threat” as a result of the controversy. See Michael Graczyk, Judge Sharon Keller speaks out
after reprimand tossed, DALLAS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2010, 8:41 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/
news/state/headlines/20101020-Judge-Sharon-Keller-speaks-out-after-7068.ece. Keller considered
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Commentators opine she was reelected because of the large percentage of
Republican straight-ticket voters in Harris County.185
3. Judge William Watkins
A third example of widespread publicity of judicial misbehavior and a strong,
negative public reaction occurred when Judge William Watkins was caught on
camera screaming at Arthur Hage, as described in Part I of this Article.186
YouTube users posted many comments in response to the video, labeling Judge
Watkins “a piece of human garbage,” calling for him to be put “behind bars,”
and suggesting he needs anger management classes.187 One commentator wrote:
“This worries me! My boyfriend . . . and I have to go before him tomorrow over
child support for our special needs child[.] I hope he don’t [sic] scream at me .
. . .”188
B. What these Examples Demonstrate about the Public’s Role in Judicial
Discipline
As these examples show, any void in the transparency of judicial misconduct
and resulting discipline is often filled by informal means, through the traditional
press and social media. Some will look favorably on the publicity and the
public’s ability to weigh in on the judge’s conduct. However, the publicity and
resulting public reaction is troubling because it changes the consequences a
judge suffers for her misbehavior. Regardless of whether the judge “deserves”
the public reaction and resulting humiliation or anger, these consequences differ
markedly from what disciplinary tribunals intend judges to experience as a result
of public discipline.
IV. IN LIGHT OF THE SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECT AND LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF
SHAMING AN ANGRY JUDGE, CORRECTIONS SHOULD BE PREVENTIVE,
CONSTRUCTIVE, AND RESTORATIVE
Disciplinary tribunals should either remove an offending judge or strive to
correct his behavior without stigmatizing or alienating him. Restorative justice
provides insight into how to use shame while avoiding its stigmatizing impact;
organizations involved in educating judges and regulating their behavior should
use these insights to make today’s discipline more effective at rehabilitating the

resigning, but decided against it because she did not want to appear to have surrendered to the
pressure.
185. See Kolten Parker, Past haunts judge seeking re-election, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 24 2012),
http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Keller-faces-opponent-and-her-history-in-November3979348.php.
186. See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text.
187. Judge Watkins YOUTUBE Video, supra note 16, at “Top Comments.”
188. Id.

614

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:589

angry judge. This approach would strive to make shame reintegrative, rather
than simply stigmatizing.189
At the outset, organizations involved in educating judges and regulating
judicial behavior should strive to keep judges out of the disciplinary process by
employing informal means of correcting misbehavior before it becomes serious
or frequent. Bar associations, lawyers’ assistance programs, the American
Judicature Society,190 and judicial education organizations191 should aim to
educate judges not only about proper judicial demeanor, but also about how to
maintain this demeanor during their time on the bench. Given that a judge is
most likely to respond to corrections from someone whom he trusts,192
corrections should include peer-to-peer meetings about angry behavior, ideally
before the behavior escalates in severity or frequency. Furthermore, to the extent
possible, reconciliation-type meetings with the offended lawyer or party would
serve as a valuable tool for correcting a judge’s angry behavior.
A. Continuing and Introductory Judicial Education
Education, for both new and more seasoned judges, should emphasize both
the importance of demeanor and how to maintain it while on the bench. Judges
should be taught and continually reminded about the importance of procedural
fairness, regulating their emotions, decision fatigue, and the many stressors
accompanying judging that can impact demeanor. Any judicial education
should start with the premise that courtesy in the courtroom is important because
participants in the legal system assess fairness on the basis of how they are
treated.193 Resources concerning procedural fairness should be made available
to all judges. Judges should also be taught about emotional intelligence so that
they can regulate their emotions instead of trying to suppress them.194 In this

189. See infra Part IV.C.
190. See About AJS, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/about (last visited Apr. 8,
2014) (explaining that the American Judicature Society was formed to “promote[] fair and impartial
courts through research, publications, education, and advocacy for judicial reform.”).
191. See, e.g., About Us, TEX. CTR. FOR JUDICIARY, http://yourhonor.com/about (last visited
Apr. 8, 2014) (explaining that the Texas Center for the Judiciary’s mission of “Judicial Excellence
Through Education” is fulfilled “on a daily basis in a variety of ways including continuing judicial
education programs, new judge mentoring programs, an integrated curriculum design,
comprehensive faculty development, and the development of Bench Books and online resources
for Texas judges.”); Education, JUDICIAL EDUC. CENTER, http://jec.unm.edu/education (last visited
Apr. 8, 2014) (providing resources for New Mexico judges).
192. See infra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
193. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 73 (1990). As Terry Maroney explains
in her article about angry judges: “[t]hough complete suppression of judges’ emotions is not a
worthy goal, regulation of these emotions is . . . . The innate human capacity for regulation allows
us continually to try and steer the emotional course best suited to the situation at hand.” Maroney,
supra note 2, at 1217.
194. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1217.
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way, judges could be better prepared for the challenges of serving as “the
decider.”195
This education should be available for all judges, not just those who exhibit
anger and hostility in the courtroom. Judicial disciplinary organizations should
work to preempt judges from engaging in angry behavior by making this
education typical for all members of the judiciary.196 In addition, judicial
training organizations should teach judicial support personnel about the role
decision fatigue may play in the judge’s behavior and decision-making. Support
staff can be trained to ensure that judges take breaks throughout the day; even a
short break before the end of a crowded docket may replenish the judge’s mental
reserves.197 Ultimately, support personnel may prove valuable in recognizing
the signs of increasing strain and helping judges cope with the stress of decisionmaking.
In 2009, the American Bar Association (ABA) approved a resolution urging
states to establish voluntary education programs intended to provide those
considering a judicial career a better understanding of the judge’s role and
responsibilities.198 A study group of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence has also recommended some type of formal preparation for those
who hope to be judges.199 Programs providing Introductory Judicial Education
(IJE) would develop “a cadre of potential jurists who have exhibited the interest
and the commitment to acquire an extra educational credential that potentially
could make them better qualified for the judiciary than other lawyers.”200
Professor Keith Fisher, who contributed to a symposium held to determine the
value of IJE, has identified “[d]eclining [p]ublic [c]onfidence in the [j]udiciary”
as one of the key reasons for such programs.201 Fisher also highlighted the need
for judges to treat parties and lawyers in their courtrooms with dignity and
respect.202 In light of the negative perceptions of the judiciary, largely based on
some judges’ angry behavior, Fisher proposed that an IJE curriculum could
include courses in developing listening skills, identifying personality conflicts,

195. George W. Bush coined this term to mean the person responsible for making countless
difficult decisions. See ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING THE
GREATEST HUMAN STRENGTH 90 (2011).
196. See Keith R. Fisher, Education for Legal Aspirants, 43 AKRON L. REV. 163, 164 (2010)
(highlighting that many judges are ill-prepared for the various challenges associated with being a
judge).
197. See Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in
Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889, 6892 (2011) (presenting evidence
suggesting that a judge’s “tendency to rule in favor of the status quo” can be combatted by taking
a break and eating).
198. Fisher, supra note 196, at 164.
199. Id. at 169–70.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 189.
202. Id. at 188.
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docket management, financial planning, and proper treatment of court personnel,
among other topics.203
IJE or on-the-job education during a judge’s tenure, could prove costly,
particularly if it is well executed. However, this cost should be weighed against
the expenses required for state judicial conduct commissions to investigate and
process complaints about angry judges, along with the added costs of state courts
reviewing the commissions’ decisions.
B. Peer-to-Peer Mentoring and Counseling
Ideally, methods of correcting judicial behavior should adhere to the same
principle of procedural fairness set forth earlier in this Article: people perceive
the fairness of proceedings in which they are involved based on whether the
relevant legal authorities treated them with dignity.204 Similarly, procedural
justice adherents suggest that when the disciplinary process treats people fairly
and with dignity, they will view laws and authorities as more legitimate and
more worthy of their respect.205 People then become self-regulating.206
This notion of procedural fairness is particularly important as it relates to
discipline that stigmatizes. When shame makes an offender feel like an outcast,
alienated from his community, the offender is likely to reject the sanctioning
authority and thus fail to experience the prosocial consequences of the shame.207
Shaming works most effectively to modify offending when someone who is
important to the offender imposes it.208
In the context of judicial discipline, this research suggests that the more a
judge feels that the judicial disciplinary process is fair and administered by a
trusted authority, the more likely the judge is to cooperate with the process and
follow the governing ethical guidelines.209 Although not yet studied, some
judges appear to distrust the process and the sanctioning bodies; these judges
seem to believe that discipline is meted out arbitrarily.210 Furthermore, judicial
conduct commissions are not the judge’s community, nor are they composed
entirely of members of the judge’s community.211 Accordingly, to the extent

203. Id. at 194–99.
204. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
205. Tyler, supra note 19, at 308.
206. Id.
207. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 101, at 55.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 17–19, 136–37 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Graczyk, supra note 284 (explaining that Judge Sharon Keller was critical of
the Texas Commission of Judicial Conduct, complaining that it often overstepped its authority).
Additionally, lawyers who represented Judge Nathan Hecht before the Texas Judicial Conduct
Commission complained that discipline by the Commission is “arbitrary and capricious; they just
do what they want to do . . . .” Dexheimer, supra note 5.
211. See, e.g., Members & Meetings, COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, http://cjp.ca.gov
/members_meetings.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (explaining that the California Commission on
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possible, and especially with respect to minor demeanor issues that have not yet
escalated to formal disciplinary matters, the corrections process should be
modified to allow a community of a judge’s peers to implement remedial
measures.
Organizations that facilitate peer-to-peer counseling already exist, but are
generally used for other types of challenges.212 In the context of stress and
alcohol and drug abuse, judges can participate in peer-to-peer counseling
through state bar Lawyer Assistance Programs.213 These programs help judges
identify substance abuse and mental health problems, and promote early
intervention and treatment.214 These programs often provide confidential peer
mentoring by other judges who have experienced similar problems.215 Judges
typically volunteer for these programs, both as mentors and mentees. For
example, the Texas Lawyers Assistance Program maintains a database of
volunteer judges who are wiling to provide support to other judges struggling
with substance abuse or mental health disorders.216 The Texas program also
provides contact information for the ABA’s Judges Helping Judges National
Hotline, a program designed to help judges obtain assistance for themselves or
their colleagues while maintaining confidentiality.217
Accordingly, state bar associations that have not already done so should
establish programs like Judges Helping Judges, or at least expand the scope of
existing programs to offer informal, confidential means of resolving demeanor
problems (not just substance abuse issues) before formal disciplinary
proceedings are initiated. Ideally, judicial conduct commissions could then refer
Judicial Performance is composed of eleven members: one appellate court judge, two Superior
Court judges, two attorneys, and six lay citizens).
212. Some jurisdictions offer mentoring opportunities for both new judges and more seasoned
judges who face particular challenges. Judicial Resources, TEX. CENTER FOR JUDICIARY,
https://www.yourhonor.com/judicial-resources (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (establishing a “Find a
Mentor” program). In addition, certain judicial conduct commissions specifically allow mentoring
in lieu of traditional discipline. See, e.g., TEX. CONST., art. V, § 1-a(8) (permitting the Judicial
Conduct Commission to, after an investigation, require a judge to obtain “additional training or
education”); N.M. JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMM’N R. 33(C) (2010), available at
http://nmjsc.org/docs/SKMBT_C55210041915041.pdf
(allowing
for
“[n]on-disciplinary
dispositions,” including “professional counseling, mentorship, or other assistance for the judge.”).
213. See, e.g., Texas Lawyers Assistance Program, ST. BAR TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Judges1&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15127
(last visited Apr. 9, 2014); New Mexico and Judges Assistance Program, ST. BAR N.M.,
http://www.nmbar.org/JLAP/JLAP.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
214. See, e.g., New Mexico and Judges Assistance Program, supra note 213.
215. See, e.g., Texas Lawyers Assistance Program, supra note 213.
216. Id.
217. Id. See also AM. BAR ASS’N, 2010 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS 14–22 (2010) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
legalservices/colap/downloads/20110311_aba_2010_colap_comprehensive_survey.authcheckdam
.pdf (providing a comprehensive look at the services provided by Lawyers Assistance Programs
and Lawyers and Judges Assistance Programs as well as data on the funding sources, clients served,
and resources provided for each state’s program).
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allegations of minor wrongdoing by angry judges (i.e., complaints that would
otherwise typically be dismissed or result in a private warning after
investigation) to these informal programs for resolution by mentoring,
counseling, or a reconciliation meeting. Such a partnership between judge
assistance programs and judicial conduct commissions, which the American
Judicature Society encourages,218 would help prevent judicial demeanor
problems from ever escalating to formal judicial misconduct charges.
Along the same lines, former Los Angeles Superior Court Judge David
Rothman recommends that judges undertake their own informal correction
methods when confronted with judicial demeanor issues.219 Specifically, Judge
Rothman suggests that based on a judge’s duty to take corrective action,220
judges should undertake informal processes to mentor or otherwise correct the
behavior of other judges who violate rules of judicial conduct. This could
include a reconciliation meeting or a presiding or other senior judge mentoring
the judge who engaged in inappropriate conduct.221 Allowing corrective action
to take place either through an established Lawyers Assistance Program or other
informal means could be the most effective means of protecting the public, as
the authority providing the correction would presumably be one the offending
judge trusts, and, ideally, the proceeding would not become adversarial. As
discussed below, striving to make the process just (from the judge’s perspective)
and the correction restorative rather than punitive would serve to eliminate the
harmful consequences that come with shaming the offending judge.
An obvious challenge to the informal process is that a judge might not be
willing to confront another judge with an allegation of misconduct or
wrongdoing. Furthermore, a judge might be unwilling to report his colleague to

218. See Guidelines for Cases Involving Judicial Disability, 69 JUDICATURE 110, 111 (1985)
(providing that “it may be advisable for judicial conduct organizations to encourage the creation or
expansion of state assistance programs where assistance programs are lacking.”).
219. Telephone Interview with Judge David Rothman (Nov. 9, 2012) (on file with author).
220. For example, the California Code of Ethics provides that: “[w]henever a judge has reliable
information that another judge has violated any provision of the Code of Judicial Ethics, the judge
shall take appropriate corrective action, which may include reporting the violation to the
appropriate authority.” CA. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3D(1) (2013), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf. Canon 3D defines “appropriate
corrective action” to include “direct communication with the judge or lawyer who has committed
the violation, other direct action . . . or a report of the violation to the presiding judge, appropriate
authority, or other agency or body.” Id. The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct does not
provide such an expansive rule regarding informal corrective action. See generally MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007). Rather, ABA Model Rule 2.15 of Canon 2 requires a judge who
has knowledge of another judge’s commission of a violation of the Code of Judicial Canon 2
regarding conduct to “inform the appropriate authority.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.15 (2007). The 2011 edition of the Code defines “appropriate authority” as “the authority having
responsibility for initiation of disciplinary process.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Terminology (2011).
221. Telephone Interview with David Rothman (Nov. 9, 2012) (on file with the author).
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the presiding judge or to an assistance program.222 As one commentator notes,
judges might not report “because of a human tendency of judges, like others, to
‘close ranks’ to protect their own or because [of] a ‘thin black robe of silence’
among judges . . . .”223 Yet, this is precisely why judges should be inclined to
confront a colleague who has displayed anger in the courtroom; arguably, judges
feel responsible for maintaining the judiciary’s integrity and should take
corrective action to fulfill that responsibility.224
In addition, some state judicial conduct commissions are authorized to order
peer counseling and mentoring as part of the formal disciplinary process.225
Although these corrections are arguably not as effective when imposed by
someone outside of offending judge’s community, they should be used when
possible (as private corrections) to modify the judge’s behavior before the
commission pursues public proceedings against the judge.
C. Reconciliation-Type Meetings
As a third approach, shame can be used not to stigmatize but rather to
“reintegrate” the judge into her community. As aforementioned, reintegrative
shaming attempts to use shame as a constructive force, combining strong
disapproval of an offender’s bad conduct with respect for the person who
committed the act and an invitation to rejoin her community.226 Unlike
stigmatizing shame,227 this process encourages feelings of shame regarding the
behavior but avoids stigmatizing the individual.228 Commentators define
restorative justice “a process that brings victims and offenders together to face
each other, to inform each other about their crimes and victimization, to learn
222. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.04 (4th ed. 2007)
(explaining that judicial conduct commissions were created in part because of the impression that
judges could not effectively “self-regulate,” as they were too inclined to protect one another).
223. Greene, supra note 45, at 717–18.
224. One judge’s behavior reflects on the entire judiciary. See, e.g., In re Fuller, 798 N.W.2d
408, 420 (S.D. 2011) (emphasizing that the judge’s misbehavior “makes it more difficult for every
judge in this state to maintain that respect for our courts and thus our ability to effectively resolve
society’s legal disputes.”).
225. See supra note 212.
226. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 101, at 55.
227. See id. (describing the differences between reintegrative shaming and disintegrative
shaming).
228. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 231 (2003). Proponents of reintegrative shaming suggest that
restorative justice works because of the shame that results from the wrongdoer acknowledging his
offense. See Michael S. King, Critique and Comment, Restorative Justice, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Emotionally Intelligent Justice, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 1096, 1109
(2008). The symbolic reparation that accompanies a successful mediation conference in the
restorative justice field requires these two necessary steps: (1) the offender clearly expresses
genuine shame and remorse over his actions; and (2) the victim begins to forgive the offender. See
id. In restorative justice, how shame is used (or not used) will often determine whether the
conference succeeds. See id.
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about each others’ backgrounds, and to collectively reach agreement on a
‘penalty’ or ‘restorative justice sanction.’”229 This Article uses the term
“restorative corrections” to mean corrections that contain certain attributes of
traditional restorative justice programs; it does not mean corrections as an
alternative to incarceration for a criminal.230 Rather, the Article borrows two
key attributes from restorative justice programs to recommend the same as
innovations to traditional forms of judicial discipline: the focus on community
and the use of reintegrative shaming.
In the context of criminal law, reintegrative shaming occurs in reconciliation
meetings where the offender, victim, and facilitator come together to discuss
proper reparations.231 Reintegrative shaming in the context of judicial
corrections could also involve a meeting between the offender and the offended
party, along with a facilitator trained to encourage a productive dialogue
between the two parties. The offending judge would have the opportunity to
offer an authentic apology to the offended party,232 which, if accepted, could
resolve the matter. Therefore, rather than the peer-to-peer meetings described
above, this approach would include the offended person as well.
Ideally, this restorative approach would aid in eliciting an empathic response
from the judge, rather than an angry, hostile one. It would also provide the
offended party an opportunity to air his concerns to the offending judge and
explain the impact of the judge’s behavior on the party.233 In assessing
discipline, sanctioning tribunals occasionally acknowledge the judge’s
contrition about her offensive behavior.234 However, unless ordered by the

229. Luna, supra note 228, at 228.
230. This Article’s discussion of restorative justice is not meant to compare judges’
misbehavior to crimes, but rather to extend the concept of restorative justice to the context of
judicial discipline.
231. See King, supra note 228, at 1104–05 (discussing various types of reconciliation
meetings, including victim-offender mediations, family group conferences, and circle methods,
which involve more participants, including supporters of both the victim and the offender as well
as community leaders.
232. See Goodman, supra note 100, at 1537–38 (distinguishing between real apologies, in
which the offender accepts responsibility for his actions, and “botched apologies,” in which the
offender attempts to justify her behavior and fails to express remorse). See also Stephanos Bibas
& Richard A. Bierschbach, Essay, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure,
114 YALE L.J. 85, 88–90 (2004) (highlighting the profound impact that remorse and apology can
have in the criminal law context); Luna, supra note 228, at 229 (“Accountability is evidenced by
recognizing the wrongfulness of one’s conduct, expressing remorse for any resulting injury, and
taking steps to repair damaged social relationships.”).
233. See Brown & Wolf, supra note 18, at 254–55 (explaining that the restorative approach
facilitates a broader dialogue about the offender’s conduct by including the offended party in the
disciplinary process).
234. See, e.g., In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 659 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (stating that in
determining an appropriate sanction, the court considers factors such as whether the judge
apologized for misconduct).
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commission, the victim of the judge’s rude, offensive behavior rarely hears an
apology.235
Although this type of meeting between the offender and the offended could
prove extremely beneficial as an alternative to traditional judicial discipline, the
idea is fraught with challenges. First, it puts the angry judge and the object of
the judge’s wrath at the same table, on equal footing. This runs contrary to our
typical perception of the judge as holding a position of power in our society.236
Additionally, it is difficult to imagine a judge having the humility to participate
and learn from this experience.
Furthermore, at times procedural hurdles might stand in the way of such a
meeting. Many disciplinary commissions lack the ability under their governing
rules to impose innovative alternatives to discipline. Although some
commissions can require counseling, mentoring,237 and education as part of the
disciplinary process, others are limited to private and public admonishments and
suspensions.238 Commissions that do have some degree of flexibility might use
these innovative techniques in an effort to modify the judge’s angry behavior.
For example, the New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission is permitted to
impose non-disciplinary dispositions, including counseling, mentoring, or other
assistance.239 Similarly, the California Commission on Judicial Performance
may “defer termination of a preliminary investigation for a period not to exceed
two years for observation and review of a judge’s conduct.”240 During this

235. See In re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044, 1054 (Nev. 2008) (ordering the judge to issue a formal
apology to the aggrieved party and enroll in a judicial ethics class after he ordered that the girlfriend
of a man who failed to pay traffic tickets be thrown into jail when the main failed to appear in
court).
236. Lubet, supra note 4, at 12. In describing the judge’s role in today’s society as a “maximum
boss,” Lubet noted that “[w]e stand when the judge enters and leaves the room. Our ‘pleadings’ are
‘respectfully submitted.’ Before speaking, we make sure that it ‘pleases the court.’ We obey the
judge’s orders and we even say ‘thank you’ for adverse rulings.” Id.
237. See, e.g., Pubic Reprimand and Order of Additional Education: Honorable George Henry
Boyette Justice of the Peace, Precinct 3 College Station, Brazos County, Texas, ST. TEX.
COMMISSION JUD. CONDUCT 3 http://wtaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/BoyettJudicial
Conduct20111.pdf (publicly reprimanding Judge George Boyette and ordering him to obtain ten
hours of instruction with a mentor, in addition to judicial education). See also In re Davis,
82 S.W.3d 140, 150–51 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2002) (publicly reprimanding Judge Rick Davis and
requiring him to meet with a mentor judge for eight hours).
238. According to the American Judicature Society, some states allow for informal dispositions
before formal charges are filed (including mentoring and counseling), while others do not. See
CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 87–89 (2002). For
example, Alabama allows the commission to impose advice and further counseling as an informal
disposition, whereas Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington
do not allow for informal dispositions. Id.
239. N.M. JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMM’N, supra note 212.
240. CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE R. 112 (2013), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/
res/docs/appendix/CJP_Rules.pdf.
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monitoring period, the Commission could hold a reconciliation meeting.241
These meetings could also be implemented informally, through a lawyers’
assistance program or the court itself, facilitated by the presiding judge.
In addition, if the case is still pending and the judge is still presiding, a
conversation between the judge and the offended party could not occur.
Similarly, some judges or offended parties may not agree to this type of meeting,
depending on their level of distrust of the system or each other. If the judge
displayed anger at a criminal defendant that was in some way related to the
defendant’s crime, a judge may be unwilling to apologize for his behavior,
feeling it was justified.242 However, if the case is closed or the judge is no longer
presiding over the case, a reconciliation meeting can offer a valuable opportunity
for the judge to hear from the offended party about how the judge’s anger and
hostility affected him.
D. Traditional Discipline by a Conduct Commission
With improved efforts to keep a judge’s anger from escalating to the point that
formal disciplinary charges are filed, judicial conduct commissions should serve
as the ultimate step, to be used only when other informal means have failed.
Commissions already dismiss over eighty percent of judicial conduct
complaints.243 With the remaining allegations that commissions the find
meritorious, and to the extent allowed by their applicable governing rules,244
commissions should streamline discipline for angry judges, offering one private
warning (perhaps coupled with counseling or education) and, for a subsequent
meritorious complaint, imposing discipline that will express the commission’s
condemnation while getting the judge’s attention.245 Typically, this means a
suspension.246
Commissions should avoid the typical, intermediate steps, such as publicly
reprimanding angry judges without suspension.247 By avoiding these steps,
241. Alternatively, if the disciplinary tribunal lacks authority to implement a reconciliation
meeting, judges within that jurisdiction, under the direction of the presiding judge, could undertake
to conduct the meeting themselves.
242. See Maroney, supra note 2, at 1257 (arguing that a judge is entitled to express anger or
emotion during a sentencing hearing because it “vividly demonstrates to victims and their survivors
that they are within the judge’s zone of care.”).
243. GRAY, supra note 238, at 3.
244. See id. at 87–98 (providing a list of informal and formal sanctions available to state
judicial conduct commissions.
245. By the time a second complaint is filed against a judge, he may have already engaged in
additional acts of anger and hostility on the bench, as indicated by the fact that complaints often
list multiple instances of misconduct against a particular judge.
246. See In re Eiler, 236 P.3d 872, 882 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (suspending a judge for five
days after explaining that the more typical sanctions, reprimand or censure, would be too lenient
and likely ineffective to change the judge’s behavior).
247. Public reprimands are commonly imposed for serious and repeated demeanor issues. See,
e.g., In re Schapiro, 845 So. 2d 170, 173–74 (Fla. 2003) (approving the commission’s
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sanctioning tribunals will prevent shame from exacerbating the judge’s anger
while still imposing discipline that serves to get the judge’s attention and thereby
protect the public. Furthermore, when necessary, sanctioning tribunals should
remove angry judges from the bench. This should occur only when informal,
followed by formal means of discipline (as described in this Article), have failed
to modify the judge’s behavior. Given the likelihood of recurrence and the
ineffectiveness of shaming discipline, sanctioning bodies should protect the
public by removing those angry judges for whom these corrections have
failed.248
V. CONCLUSION
In this “Age of Transparency,” publicizing both the misbehavior of angry
judges and the discipline imposed for such behavior is tempting. The public
loves learning about other people’s “dirty laundry,” particularly the wrongdoing
of celebrities and judges. And, whatever shame and humiliation result from the
publicity seems a fitting consequence for some judges’ wrongdoing; because
judges have a strong interest in maintaining their reputations, shame, in theory,
should motivate judges to behave with proper decorum on the bench.
Yet, shame impacts behavior in mysterious ways. The consequences of
shaming someone who is prone to anger are unpredictable at best and destructive
at worst. This is especially true when the shame the judge experiences as a result
of her behavior will, in all likelihood, be magnified by social media. The social
media effect serves to not only publicize the judge’s wrongdoing, but also allow
the public to react and thereby participate in the shaming.
Accordingly, the time has come to revolutionize conceptions of judicial
discipline, modify past assumptions, and take seriously the task of determining
whether public sanctions serve to correct the misbehavior of angry judges.
Watching and listening to Judge William Watkins lose his temper and scream at
Arthur Hage in the courtroom is troubling and leaves no doubt that organizations
involved in judicial education, support, and discipline should work to prevent
such outbursts and modify judges’ angry behavior through corrections. Yet,
public discipline—discipline that shames—is unlikely to serve these purposes.

recommendation of a public reprimand for a judge who repeatedly made belittling remarks,
including calling an attorney “stupid” in court); In re Wright, 694 So. 2d 734, 735–36 (Fla. 1997)
(reprimanding a judge for rude and inappropriate behavior, including telling a party to “[k]eep your
mouth shut”).
248. See In re Spruance, 532 P.2d 1209, 1226 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (removing a judge from
office and explaining that the court has a “duty to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary”).
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